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SHOULD PREEMPTION APPLY IN A
PHARMACEUTICAL CONTEXT? AN ANALYSIS
OF THE PREEMPTION DEBATE AND WHAT

REGULATORY COMPLIANCE STATUTES
CONTRIBUTE TO THE DISCUSSION
Jennifer A. Surprenant*
Should the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) s determination that a
product is safe negate a private litigant'scause of action under state law in
all circumstances, unless the FDA determines that the manufacturer
withheld relevant information regarding the safety of the product? This
Note concludes that such federalpreemption is proper because the FDA is
fully capable of making a determination regarding the adequacy of the
information disclosed by a pharmaceutical manufacturer without state
interference. Additionally, such interference on the state level hinders the
FDA's objectives and effective functioning. Thus, determinationsabout the
adequacy of the information provided to the FDA should remain in the
Agency's sound discretion and not be questioned at the state level.
INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, there has been a radical shift in pharmaceutical tort
law from a theory of regulatory compliance to one of federal preemption. 1
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved pharmaceuticals provide
perhaps one of the most convincing cases for the application of the
2
regulatory compliance defense, and now, federal preemption argument.
This shift, aided by several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions including
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent,3 seems only to be gaining ground as several
states in recent years have adopted regulatory compliance statutes, which in
some instances serve to effectively shield certain types of product
manufacturers from liability. Notably, while purporting to provide blanket
* J.D. Candidate, 2009, Fordham University

School of Law; B.A., 2006, Fordham

University at Rose Hill. Thank you to everyone who offered me support in this processparticularly my family and friends.
1. Catherine Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in
PharmaceuticalCases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1020-22
(2007).
2. Id. at 1026.
3. 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008); see infra Part I.B.4.
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immunity for manufacturers that comply with regulatory standards, some of
these statutes try to preserve a state cause of action for claimants through an
exception.
This exception revokes the grant of immunity if the
manufacturer defrauded or misrepresented
information to the FDA in
4
securing approval for its drug.
Whether or not such an exception remains viable in light of recent
jurisprudence is a matter of significant interpretative controversy. 5 This
debate has become particularly relevant lately with the 4-4 split of the
Supreme Court on this very issue in Kent.6 This Note addresses whether
FDA approval of pharmaceuticals shields their makers from tort liability
under state law under a theory of federal preemption and focuses on the
controversy surrounding state-adopted regulatory compliance statutes
containing an exception for fraud on the FDA.
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I analyzes the origins of the trend
toward federal preemption and how recent court decisions and state-enacted
regulatory compliance statutes have contributed to this debate. Part II
offers an in-depth look at the varying approaches from courts and
commentators to interpreting whether or not preemption should apply.
Finally, Part III examines regulatory compliance statutes and will argue that
state tort liability should be preempted by compliance with FDA regulation
of pharmaceuticals.
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS

Part L.A of this Note discusses the theory of federal preemption generally
and the documents that the FDA claims grant it preemptive authority. Part
I.B highlights approximately twenty years of recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence that addresses the scope of federal preemption. Finally, Part
I.C examines the states that have adopted regulatory compliance statutes
and narrows the focus of this Note to three of those states.
A. Preemptive Authority of the FDA
This section proceeds in three parts: Part I.A.1 provides general
definitional guidance about the theory of federal preemption. Part I.A.2
discusses the Medical Device Amendments (MDA)-a series of
amendments granting express preemptive authority to the FDA in the
context of medical devices. Part I.A.3 discusses the preamble to a 1996
FDA regulation (FDA Preamble)-a document that the FDA argues grants
it implied preemptive authority in the pharmaceutical context.

4. See infra Part I.C.1-2.
5. See infra Part lI.B.

6. Kent, 128 S. Ct. at 1168; see infra Part I.B.4.
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1. Theory of Federal Preemption
Federal preemption has risen recently from nothing more than a "blip on
the radar screen to one of the most powerful defenses in all of products
by some as the most
liability law." 7 As a result, it has been characterized
8
important doctrine of products liability law today.
As a general matter, preemption is an affirmative defense, waivable by
the defendant, which arises when federal regulations conflict with state law
(1) express
claims. 9 There are two types of federal preemption:
language
that
preemption, which arises when a federal statute contains
expressly preempts state regulation or legislation, and (2) implied
preemption, which arises as either field preemption or conflict
preemption. 10
Implied field preemption arises when either a pervasive regulatory
scheme is already in place at the federal level or when there is such a
dominant federal interest that it is assumed that enforcement of state laws
on the same issue are precluded.11 Conversely, implied conflict preemption
arises either when there is a direct conflict between federal and state
provisions, thus making compliance with both impossible, or when a state
and execution of the full purposes and
obscures "the accomplishment
12
objectives of Congress."
Historically, the Supreme Court has advocated for a presumption against
a finding of preemption, concluding that there is an "assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superceded by [a]
13
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'
This presumption, in essence, rests upon the notion that "the Constitution
constrains the federal government, the powers of which are limited and
specifically enumerated," 14 from "cavalierly pre-empt[ing] state-law causes
of action." 15 In the past it was common for the Supreme Court to interpret
product safety statutes using such a mindset. 16 However, as observed by

7. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 895 (2005).

8. Id.
9. See Jonathan V. O'Steen & Van O'Steen, The FDA Defense:

Vioxx® and the

Argument Against FederalPreemption of State Claimsfor Injuries Resultingfrom Defective

Drugs, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 67, 69 (2006); David G. Owen, Federal Preemption of Products
Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 413 (2003).

10. See Stephen J. Tortline & Detek Teeter, Federal Preemption in Products Liability
Cases, 76 J. KAN. B. ASS'N 32, 33 (2007).

11. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
12. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see also Owen, supra note 9, at 416.
13. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (discussing federal preemption of state action); see also Owen,
supra note 9, at 417.
14. Owen, supra note 9, at 417.
15. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see also Owen, supra note 9, at
417; Tortline & Teeter, supra note 10, at 34.
16. See generally Veit D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085,

2085-86 (2000) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court's general acceptance of the
presumption against preemption).
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many commentators, in more recent years, the Supreme Court has started
17
moving away from such a presumption-if not abandoning it entirely.
Two documents, the MDA and the FDA Preamble, provide the primary
framework for the preemption debate in the pharmaceutical context.
Indeed, both sides of the argument for and against preemption look to these
documents for support. They are discussed below.
2. The MDA
While the primary focus of this Note is implied preemption, one cannot
ignore the important impact that the MDA-an example of express
preemption-has had. 18 In 1976, Congress passed the MDA as a series of
amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 19 thereby
giving the FDA the authority to classify and monitor the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices. The MDA requires screening of all
medical devices seeking approval through a pre-market approval process
(PMA), which on average requires 1200 hours to conduct. 20 In the realm of
federal preemption, pharmaceutical products pose an interesting question
because, while the MDA clearly applies express preemption for medical
21
devices, there is no such express preemption clause for prescription drugs.
The lack of an express preemption provision for pharmaceutical products
22
has not escaped the notice of both courts and commentators.
3. The FDA Preamble
In 2006, the FDA adopted a preamble to its 1996 prescription drug
labeling rule, which asserted that, "FDA approval of labeling under the act
17. See Owen, supra note 9, at 417; Tortline & Teeter, supra note 10, at 34. For a
thorough analysis of the Court's move away from such a presumption, see infra Part I.B.
18. While a thorough discussion of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) is beyond
the scope of this Note, their importance has not escaped the notice of many commentators
who have written amply on the subject. See generally Brad Kenneth Lindow, Medical
Device Amendments Act Does Not Preempt All State Law Claims, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 32 (1998); Gregory J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and
Premarket Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245
(2004); Michael P. DiNatale, Comment, Patients Beware: Preemption of Common Law
Claims Under the Medical Device Amendments, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV.75 (2005).
19. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as

amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360 (2000)).
20. 21 U.S.C. § 360. The MDA classifies medical devices into three different classes of
devices each reflecting a different degree of risk to human health, with Class III devices
presenting the greatest risk and Class I devices representing the lowest. Id. § 360c(a).
Because of the heightened risk they pose, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires
Class III devices to undergo a rigorous screening process for safety and effectiveness before
they are placed on the market. Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 477; see also Owen, supra note 9, at
430.
21. See W. Wylie Blair, Implied Preemption of State Tort Law Clams Against

PrescriptionDrug ManufacturersBased Upon FDA Approval, 27 J. LEGAL MED. 289, 293
(2006).
22. See Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1035 (S.D. I11.
2001);
O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 82.
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conflicting or contrary State law." 23 The FDA was adamant
that state law decisions that reject the preemptive authority of FDA labeling
"rely on and propagate interpretations of the Act and FDA regulations that
conflict with the agency's own interpretations and frustrate the agency's
implementation of its statutory mandate." 24 Incidentally, the FDA has
emphasized that its requirements set both a ceiling and a floor for
...preempts

manufacturer compliance. 25 This notably is in opposition to the FDA's
previous position, which as of 1997 established only26minimum standards, to
which states were free to add additional protections.
The FDA now proclaims that tort law claims for injuries interfere with its
ability to properly regulate the market. 2 7 This position stems from the fact
that "safety," when discussing pharmaceutical products, is essentially
different than safety in the context of other products since virtually all drugs
have side effects that would lead them to be deemed "unsafe" if considered

in any other context. 28 As noted by Mary J. Davis, this recent position of

the FDA "favoring preemption-that its labeling regulations establish

optimal standards in some cases from which state law may not deviateplaces federal preemption of prescription drug labeling actions directly" at
the forefront of the preemption debate. 29 Notably, this shifting stance of the
regulatory
FDA has aided in the recent changing landscape from
30

compliance to federal preemption in the pharmaceutical arena.
B. The Shifting Stance of the Supreme Court

Over the past decade and a half, there has been a dramatic shift in the

courts from an attitude of regulatory compliance to one of federal
23. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2007); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption
by Preamble: FederalAgencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
227, 227 (2007). This formal declaration was given by the FDA after the courts evinced
"reluctance ...to accept amicus briefs as a formal statement of the agency's intent." Howard
L. Dorfman et al., Presumptionof Innocence: FDA's Authority to Regulate the Specifics of
Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption Debate, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585, 593
(2006).
24. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 n.7 (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.56).
25. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 537 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (citing
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934-45).
26. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 77. But see Dorfman et al., supra note 23,
at 590. Howard L. Dorfman and his colleagues argue that since 1991, the FDA has asserted
that its regulations set both a ceiling and a floor. In support of this proposition, they cite a
statement by the former FDA chief counsel where he declares that the "FDA surely does not
regard its own prescription drug labeling decisions as merely establishing a floor. . . . On
the contrary, FDA regards such labeling as fully adequate for the purpose of informing
physicians of all necessary information." Id. at 590 n.49.
27. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 77.
28. Dorfman, et al., supra note 23, at 590.
29. Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the
FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1092-93 (2007).
30. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 77.
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preemption. 3 1 This shift began in the early 1990s, however as the case law
(including the recent indecision in Kent) suggests, the Court has been
grappling with the difficult task of trying to find the proper balance between
federal regulatory compliance and the powers of the states. The following
cases illustrate this shift.
1. Cipollone v. Liggett Group
Until the early 1990s, the Supreme Court, when deciding common-law
tort claims, was noticeably hesitant to find preemption. 32 Indeed, the Court
was formerly so reluctant that it advocated a presumption against
preemption, relying on the "assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by a Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress." 33 The Court in Cipollone v.
Liggett Group,34 thoroughly outlined the analysis for a finding of
preemption:
Congress' intent may be "explicitly stated in the statute's language or
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." In the absence of an
express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law
actually conflicts with federal law, or if federal law so thoroughly
occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable35 the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.

Thus, the Court in Cipollone went on to find in favor of federal
preemption, allowing it to become the landmark case "trigger[ing] a notable
upsurge in the successful use of preemption as a defense to products
'36
liability lawsuits."
In Cipollone, the estate of a life-long smoker, who died of lung cancer,
brought an action against three cigarette manufacturers alleging that they
failed to warn about the dangers of smoking. 37 The Court held that the
Public Health and Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 expressly preempted
state failure-to-warn claims. 38

31. See Sharkey, supra note 1, at 1020-22.
32. See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims at the

Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REv. 903, 906 (1996) ("In the decade
before Cipollone, the Court expressed a marked reluctance to find preemption of commonlaw tort claims, but its [recent] decisions . . . suggest a significant reversal in this attitude.").
33. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Tortline &
Teeter, supra note 10, at 34 (explaining the Court's movement away from traditional notions
of a presumption against preemption).
34. 505 U.S. 504 (1992). Though Cipollone v. Liggett Group deals with cigarettes and
not pharmaceutical products or even medical devices, its inclusion here is meant to illustrate
the beginnings of the Court's trend toward preemption in products liability actions more
generally.
35. Id. at 516 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing.Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1997)).
36. See Noah, supra note 32, at 904.
37. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 504.
38. Id. at 530-31.
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2. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
Not long after Cipollone, the Court issued a conflicting determination on
preemption in the medical context in its Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 39 decision.
In Lohr, a Medtronic pacemaker, which had been implanted within the

plaintiff, failed, requiring her to undergo emergency surgery to remove a
heart blockage. 40 The plaintiff initiated the suit against Medtronic alleging
negligence and strict liability.4 1 In response, Medtronic argued for
summary judgment, declaring that both of the claims were preempted by §

360k(a). 4 2 Unable to reach a majority, the Court issued a plurality opinion
authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, 43 which began by noting that "we
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law
Justice Stevens disagreed with Medtronic's
causes of action." 44

interpretation of § 360k, finding the notion that Congress "would... bar[]
most, if not all, relief for persons injured by defective medical devices" to
be implausible. 4 5 Such a reading, coupled with the lack of an overt

legislative attempt to "pre-empt most, let alone all, general common-law

duties enforced by damages actions," 4 6 led to the Court's conclusion that
the design defect claims asserted by the claimant against Medtronic were
not barred by the preemption clause in the MDA. 4 7 The conflicting results
reached by Cipollone and Lohr, if anything, evidence a general skepticism

on the part of the Court, which was not48 quite ready to part with its
traditional presumption against preemption.

39. 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
40. Id. at 480-81.
41. Id. at 481.
42. Id.
43. Justice Stephen Breyer, concurring, noted (along with the dissent) that "the MDA
will sometimes pre-empt a state-law tort suit," but concluded that the provisions did not
preempt any of the state requirements that were at issue. Id. at 503, 505 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Sandra Day O'Connor, in a
concurrence/dissent written by Justice O'Connor, distinguish their opinion from the plurality
by concluding that "a state common-law claim is pre-empted if it would impose any
requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable to the
device under the FDCA." Id. at 514 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 485.
45. Id. at 487 ("Medtronic's construction of § 360k would therefore have the perverse
effect of granting complete immunity from design defect liability to an entire industry that,
in the judgment of Congress, needed more stringent regulation .... ).
46. Id. at 491 ("There is, to the best of our knowledge, nothing in the hearings, the
Committee Reports, or the debates suggesting that any proponent of the legislation intended
a sweeping pre-emption of traditional common-law remedies against manufacturers and
distributors of defective devices.").
47. Id. at 494.
48. See Tortline & Teeter, supra note 10, at 34.
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3. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'LegalCommittee
In 2001, again faced with a medical device issue, the Court in Buckman
Co. v. Plaintifs'Legal Committee affirmatively stated that "no presumption
against pre-emption" applies. 4 9 In Buckman, the Court analyzed a factual
situation where a defendant medical-products manufacturer hired a
50
consultant, Buckman Co., to help obtain FDA approval for its product.
This collaboration resulted in approval for its product through rather
egregious acts of defrauding the Agency. 5 l Subsequently, plaintiffs, who
were injured by the defendant's product, sought to bring a state tort cause of
action against the defendant for their injuries. 52 Plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant made fraudulent representations to the FDA in the course of the
device approval process and that, but for these misrepresentations, the
53
device would not have been approved.
In response, the Supreme Court unanimously held that federal law
impliedly preempted such state law fraud-on-the-FDA claims. 54 To that
effect, the Court stated that "[s]tate-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably
conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud consistently with the
Administration's judgment and objectives," and would "cause applicants to
fear that their disclosures to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by the
'55
Administration, will later be judged insufficient in state court.
Moreover, the Court noted that the FDA is aptly empowered to pursue and
prosecute fraud perpetrated against it and that "[p]olicing fraud against [a]
federal agenc[y was] hardly 'a field which the States have traditionally
occupied.' ' 56 However, the Court's Buckman decision has sparked more
questions than it has answered, resulting in a situation where "[s]tates may
not be concerned about protecting federal agencies, but states have a strong
'57
interest in protecting their citizens from fraud and personal injuries.
4. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent
The Supreme Court on March 3, 2008, issued its most recent decision
impacting the pharmaceutical preemption debate in Kent. In Kent, the
Court considered the recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
49. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 341 (2001).
50. Id. at 346.
51. Id. Buckman Co. was retained by AcroMed to help secure approval for its spinal
bone screw product. After two denials of FDA approval, the applicant split the spinal screw
into its component parts and resought approval. However, this time, rather than seeking
clearance for spinal use, the applicant sought approval to market the plates and screws for
use in arm and leg bones. It was on this ground that AcroMed secured approval for its
product. Following this approval, spinal surgeons began to use the product widely. Id.
52. Id. at 343.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 341-42.
55. Id. at 350-51.
56. Id. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
57. In re Medtronic, Inc., Implantable Defibrillators Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 886, 899 (D.
Minn. 2006).
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Second Circuit in Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co.,58 which asked if a
federal law prohibiting fraudulent disclosures and communications to a
government agency preempted a state law granting plaintiffs a cause of
action to sue for injuries sustained from defective products that would have
reached the market absent such fraud. 59 The Court deadlocked on the
split (with Chief Justice John Roberts recusing himself
question in a 4-4
60
decision).
from
Thus, while the case at the outset appeared to have the potential to shed
significant light on the preemption debate and the role of state statutes
against that of federal agencies, in actuality, it did no such thing. Without
even issuing a written opinion, the Court in Kent presented more questions
than answers.

61

C. Regulatory Compliance Statutes in the PharmaceuticalContext
Several states, through the adoption of regulatory compliance statutes,
have added to the discussion of what the proper approach should be to
determining whether or not preemption should apply in the pharmaceutical
context. The vast majority of states are opposed to the regulatory
compliance defense, with most concluding that compliance with Agency
regulations is only one of many factors to be taken into account in tort
actions. 62 However, in recent years several states have adopted such
statutes, which aim to shield a drug manufacturer from liability for its FDA
statutes seems to coincide
approved drugs. 63 Indeed, the adoption of these
64

with tort reform efforts throughout the country.

1. Granting (and Taking Away?) Immunity Through Exception
Some of the statutes, though purporting to provide complete immunity,
declare that if the manufacturer defrauded or deceived the FDA to secure its
drug approval, then the grant of immunity does not apply. 65 The phrasing
of these statutes differs slightly, but importantly. Of the enacted regulatory
compliance statutes, seven states bar punitive damages against drug
manufacturers of FDA-approved drugs. 66 Eight states provide a "weaker
58. 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006).
59. See infra Part II.B.
60. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168, 1168 (2008).

61. Id.
62. See Sharkey, supra note 1, at 1024.
63. See id. at 1023.
64. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 11, Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (No. 06-1498), 2007 WL
1420562.
65. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Fraud Caveat to Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L.

REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 3, on file with author).
66. Id. at 8 ("Arizona, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah-bar punitive
damages against drug manufacturers who have complied with FDA guidelines."); see ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5 (West 2000); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.2-11(6), (7)(a) (1996 & Supp. 2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(C)
(West 2003); OR. REV.STAT. ANN. § 30.927 (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (2002).
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form of protection in the form of a rebuttable presumption that FDA67
approved warnings are adequate in the face of failure-to-warn claims."
2. Regulatory Compliance Defense Across the Country
Though only a handful of states have effective regulatory compliance
statutes, the power of the argument has not escaped the notice of defendants
everywhere, thus ushering it into courts across the country to varying
degrees of success. 68 Indeed, courts countrywide are split on the issue, with
some siding with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's
69 and
interpretative reading of preemption arguments in light of Buckman
70
opinion.
Circuit's
Second
the
with
themselves
aligning
others
Notably, as explained by Catherine Sharkey, "[s]ubsumed within the
preemption question is a corresponding evidentiary one, namely whether
evidence of the inadequacy of the defendant's representations to the FDA is
admissible in support of common-law claims"--a question faced by all the
71
courts grappling with these issues, regulatory compliance statute or not.
Indeed, some courts have become so restrictive that they have refused to
72
allow any and all private actions premised on fraud on the FDA.

67. Sharkey, supra note 65 (manuscript at 8) (listing "Colorado, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, New Jersey, Tennessee, Texas, and Utah"); see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(1)
(2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1 (LexisNexis 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a)
(1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (2000); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007 (Vernon

2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (2002).
68. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 64, at 8-9; Sharkey, supra note 65
(manuscript at 14).
69. See Webster v. Pacesetter, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that
that the "plaintiffs are precluded from arguing that defendant[] ... fail[ed] to adhere to the
FDA regulations.., since such claims are preempted by the ...Supreme Court's holding in
Buckman" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Healthpoint, Ltd. v. Ethex Corp.,
273 F. Supp. 2d 817, 841 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (concluding that "the 'direct interpretation and
application of" regulations was a job better left to the FDA (quoting Braintree Labs., Inc. v.
Nephro-Tech, Inc., No. 96-2459-JWL, 1997 WL 94237, at *6 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 1997));
Baker v. St. Jude Med., S.C., Inc., 178 S.W.3d 127, 138 (Tex. App. 2005) (noting the
Buckman concerns of having the states interfere in the functioning of a federal agency, as
well as the notion that the FDA was well equipped to police and deter fraud against itself
without state interference).
70. See In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 011396, 2004 WL 45503, at *5 (D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004) (noting that "[p]reemption is
disfavored in areas of historic importance to the states' police powers--areas such as public
health and safety," and finding no implication of the Buckman concerns); Bryant v.
Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 725 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that federal law
did not preempt the claim because plaintiff was not asserting a fraud claim or a violation of
federal law, but rather was asserting that defendant violated duties arising under state
statutory and common law).
71. Sharkey, supranote 65 (manuscript at 14).
72. Id. ("[A]n Ohio federal district court ... claimed that evidence would be excluded
outright not only 'when it is offered only to show that the FDA was misled, or that
information was intentionally concealed from the FDA,' but also when '[e]xclusion of
further evidence may be necessary to prevent confusion of the jury as to the nature of
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Professor Sharkey goes on to note, however, that "[i]t is more typical...
for courts to take an approach that forecloses causes of action that require
'73
proof of fraud rather than prohibiting the use of fraud evidence full stop."
D. The Three Statutes at Issue: Michigan, Texas, and New Jersey
Termed by some a "[s]tate-[s]ponsored [p]reemption," statutes that forbid
lawsuits against manufacturers that complied with FDA regulations and did
not defraud or deceive the Agency are a recent addition to the changing face
of products liability tort actions. 74 However, a determination of how to
interpret these statutes-particularly those that allow for imposition of
liability if such deception can be shown-is far from conclusive. While
there are several states with provisions providing exceptions to immunity
for deceiving the FDA, this Note focuses on three states-Michigan, Texas,
and New Jersey-to help further explore the current debate on the proper
role of preemption in the pharmaceutical liability context. Notably, each
statute attempts to preserve liability for manufacturers deceiving the FDA
in a slightly different manner.
1. The Michigan Statute and Interpretative Case Law
Michigan's statute is unique among these statutes in that it provides
complete blanket immunity, but then through an exception, declares that
such immunity does not apply if the manufacturer "[i]ntentionally
withholds ... or misrepresents" information to the FDA. 75 Through this
explicit language of fraud (which is compounded by the requirement of a
showing of reliance on the misinformation by the FDA), the Michigan
statute references a stand-alone crime, and is also the most contentious of
the three statutes herein examined. 76 The text of the statute reads as
follows:
In a product liability action against a manufacturer or seller, a product that
is a drug is not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the manufacturer
or seller is not liable, if the drug was approved for safety and efficacy by
the United States food and drug administration, and the drug and its
labeling were in compliance with the United States food and drug
administration's approval at the time the drug left the control of the
manufacturer or seller . . . . This subsection does not apply if the
defendant...

[plaintiff's] claims."' (quoting Bouchard v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 802, 812
(N.D. Ohio 2002))).
73. Id.
74. O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 89.
75. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2000).

76. Id. Also, though not a subject of this Note, the regulatory compliance statute of
North Dakota is unique and interesting in that it also refers to a stand-alone crime. That
statute explicitly refers (not to fraud) but to bribery of an agency official. N.D. CENT. CODE §
32-03.2-1 1(7)(b) (1996 & Supp. 2007).
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(a) Intentionally withholds from or misrepresents to the United States
food and drug administration information concerning the drug that is
required to be submitted under the federal food, drug, and cosmetic
act ... and the drug would not have been approved, or the United
States food and drug administration would have withdrawn
approval
77
for the drug if the information were accurately submitted.
The discontent surrounding this statute emanates from a circuit split
between the Sixth and Second Circuits regarding what its proper
interpretation should be. Indeed, on September 25, 2007, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to help sort out some of the contention surrounding
this statute. 78 However, on March 3, 2008, the Supreme Court deadlocked
79
in a 4-4 split, thus keeping the controversy alive.
80
In Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories,
an anomalous case of the
preemption debate, the Sixth Circuit examined the statute. 81 The court
disagreed with the plaintiffs proposed conclusion that "drug manufacturers
[sh]ould enjoy no immunity at all" and instead decided to only partially
invalidate the statutory fraud exception.8 2 In doing so, the court concluded
that for the state to be allowed to prosecute instances of fraud, the FDA
must make a prior determination that such fraud has occurred; otherwise the
83
central tenets of Buckman would be violated.
In 2007, when the Second Circuit was given its turn to interpret the
Michigan statute, it expressly refused to follow Garciain declaring that the
84
fraud exceptions in state immunity statutes escape preemption.
Interpreting the Buckman decision, the Second Circuit concluded that the
Supreme Court's statements were predominantly concerned with making
sure that the policing of fraud on the FDA did not interfere with how the
FDA chose to police itself.85 The Second Circuit emphasized that, since
Michigan's section 600.2946(5) could not "reasonably be characterized as a

77. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (citations omitted).
78. Wamer-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 31 (2007) (granting certiorari).
79. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008).
80. 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004). Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories is an unusual
preemption case because in that case, the plaintiff, not the defendant, advanced the
preemption argument. Indeed, the plaintiff argued that under the principles of Buckman, the
entire statute should be invalidated as "impliedly preempted by federal law because it
requires one to prove fraud on the FDA as part of her cause of action against the Defendant."
Id. at 965.
81. Id at 963. Garcia involved an individual who suffered severe liver failure as a
result of adverse side effects she experienced while taking "Duract, a non-steroidal, antiinflammatory prescription medication manufactured by" Wyeth-Ayerst. Id. at 963.
82. Id. at 967.
83. Id. at 966 ("Buckman prohibits a plaintiff from invoking the exceptions on the basis
of state court findings of fraud on the FDA ....
But the [Buckman] concerns do not arise
when the FDA itself determines that a fraud has been committed on the agency during the
regulatory-approval process.").
84. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2006). Desiano v. WarnerLambert & Co. was considered by the Supreme Court under Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent,
128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008).
85. Id. at 93.
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state's attempt to police fraud against the FDA," the traditional presumption
against preemption held. 86 Thus, the Second Circuit upheld the validity of

the statute based upon: (1) state regulation of tort law affecting health and
safety (as to which the presumption against preemption applies), rather than
an attempted use of state law to police fraud on the FDA; (2) alleged
violation of state common-law duties, rather than solely the federal duty of

candor to the FDA; and (3) invocation of fraud on the FDA to rebut an
87
affirmative defense, rather than as an element in a claim.
2. The Texas Statute and Interpretative Case Law
Texas also has a statute that forbids suits against manufacturers of
pharmaceuticals when those manufacturers obtain approval from the FDA

for their drugs. The Texas statute provides for a rebuttable presumption
that FDA-approved warnings on pharmaceutical drugs are sufficient, which

can be rebutted if the defendant withheld or misrepresented information. 88
The statute does not reference an independent crime on the FDA (like

Michigan's), but rather removes protection if the plaintiff can prove general
misconduct on the part of the defendant. 89 The statute reads as follows:
(a) In a products liability action alleging that an injury was caused by a

failure to provide adequate warnings or information with regard to a
pharmaceutical product, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
defendants . . . are not liable with respect to the allegations involving
failure to provide adequate warnings or information if:
(1) the warnings [and products]... were those approved by the
[FDA] ....
(b) The claimant may rebut the presumption in Subsection (a) as to each
defendant by establishing that:
(1) The defendant, before or after pre-market approval or licensing of
the product, withheld from or misrepresented to the [FDA] required
information that was material and relevant to the performance of the
product and was causally related to the claimant's injury ....90

86. Id. at 94.
87. Id. at 92-97.
88. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007 (Vernon 2005); see also Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 64, at 11.
89. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007. Though not a subject of this Note, the
wording of the Ohio statute also speaks to misconduct generally in that it removes protection
if the harm suffered by the plaintiff was the "result of misconduct of the manufacturer or
supplier ... that manifested a flagrant disregard of the safety of persons who might be
harmed by the product." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A) (LexisNexis 2005). Thus, the
Ohio statute (by requiring "a flagrant disregard") is worded more harshly than the Texas
statute, which merely requires that the defendant have "withheld from or misrepresented to
the [FDA] required information that was material and relevant to the performance of the
product." Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A), with TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 82.007.
90. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007.
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As of yet, only the District Court of Texas, a state court, has considered
the validity of the Texas statute. 9 1 In Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., the Texas
court, aligning itself with the position of the Sixth Circuit, concluded that
the Texas statute was "preempted to the extent that someone other than the
FDA is being asked to make the determination" of fraud. 92 The plaintiffs in
Ledbetter tried to advance the position that the Texas statute was different
from Michigan's because it did not require an explicit finding of fraud. 93 In
granting summary judgment to the defendants, the court evinced a concern
with the three tenets upon which Buckman based its holding, noting that
"[a]ll of the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in Buckman would
'94
manifest themselves if the motion for summary judgment were denied.
3. The New Jersey Statute and Interpretative Case Law
Finally, the New Jersey statute at issue provides relief from punitive
damages if the manufacturer complied with FDA regulations, though it
removes protection if the manufacturer secured such approval
deceptively. 95 The New Jersey statute (commonly referred to as the New
Jersey Product Liability Act), in a manner seemingly in between that of the
Michigan and Texas statutes, requires a showing of knowledge of the
withheld information to remove the statutory protection. 96 Notably, the
statute only provides protection from punitive damages. 97 The entirety of
the statute reads as follows:
In any product liability action the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable
for harm caused by a failure to warn if the product contains an adequate
warning or instruction .... An adequate product warning or instruction is
one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances
would have provided with respect to the danger and that communicates
adequate information on the dangers and safe use of the product ....

If

the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device...
[has] been approved or prescribed by the [FDA] . . . a rebuttable

presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate. For
purposes of this section, the terms "drug", "device", "food", and "food

91. Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., Nos. 2005-59499, 2005-58543, 2007 WL 1181991 (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Harris County Apr. 19, 2007).

92. Id. at *10.
93. Id. at *8.
94. Id. at *9.
95. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000).
96. Id. Though outside the scope of this Note, four other statutes in a manner similar to
New Jersey's remove protection if the defendant "knowingly" withheld information from the
FDA: Arizona, North Dakota, Oregon, and Utah. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701
(2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-1 ](7)(a) (1996 & Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30.927 (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (2002).
97. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c). The statutes of Utah, Arizona, Oregon, and
North Dakota similarly only protect against punitive damages and not damages more
broadly. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(6), (7)(a); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30.927; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2.
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additive" have the meanings defined in the "Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act."
(c) Punitive damages shall not be awarded if a drug or device or food or
food additive which caused the claimant's harm was subject to premarket
approval or licensure by the [FDA] .... However, where the product
manufacturer knowingly withheld or misrepresented information required
to be submitted under the agency's regulations, which information was
material and relevant to the harm in question, punitive damages may be
awarded. 98
In McDarby v. Merck & Co., the Superior Court of New Jersey recently
was able to reexamine the validity of its regulatory compliance statute
against the current landscape of controversy. 99 The lower court in this case
had already reviewed the substance of plaintiffs claims and had awarded
large sums of compensatory and punitive damages to both plaintiffs, which
the defendant, Merck, appealed. 10 0 The joint plaintiffs in that case claimed
that Merck knew that the drug increased the risk of heart attack but failed to
warn of the risk. 1 1 Conversely, Merck argued that since changes to a label
are governed by the FDCA and its accompanying regulations, a state law
cause of action based upon the warnings would conflict with the federal law
and must be preempted. 10 2 Thus, it found that the lower court improperly
03
awarded such large amounts of damages. 1
While recognizing the recent deadlock of the Supreme Court in Kent and
the pendency of appeal before the Supreme Court of Levine v. Wyeth, the
New Jersey Superior Court concluded that "[e]xisting New Jersey precedent
clearly supports the conclusion that the FDCA does not preempt state-law
tort remedies under theories of express conflict or implied preemption in
10 4
[the] duty-to-wam context."
In finding that there was no statutory preemption, the court relied on the
New Jersey Supreme Court's previous statement in Feldman v. Lederle
Labs that "granting immunity to a drug manufacturer from liability in
[failure to warn] circumstance[s] would 'conflict with Congress' well-

98. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4, 5(c).
99. McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). Notably,

since the statute's inception in 1987, the New Jersey Supreme Court had examined it once
before in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 592 A.2d 1176 (N.J. 1991). In that case, the
New Jersey Supreme Court articulated the position that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act

(FDCA) does not preempt state tort remedies such as those available in New Jersey because
of the state's express purpose of protecting the health and safety of its citizens. Id. at 1189.
100. McDarby, 949 A.2d at 229.

101. Id. at 242-48.
102. Id. at 249.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 251. For more information on Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert.
granted, 128 S.Ct. 1118 (2008), see supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
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recognized purpose in enacting the FDCA,"' which was the protection of
05
consumers from dangerous products.1
The court also went on to conclude that regulatory preemption did not
apply for two reasons: (1) the labeled changes sought by the plaintiff did
not conflict with the blackletter provisions of the FDA Preamble' 06 and (2)
the preamble applies to "circumstances in which state law appear[s] to
mandate warnings that [the] FDA ha[s] specifically considered and rejected
as scientifically unsubstantiated."' 1 7 Thus, because "the 'balance of risks
and benefits set by the FDA when it approves a drug label"' are not affected
by the proposed labeling sought, the state cause of action was not
preempted by federal regulations. 108 Regardless of this lack of conflict, the
court offered a general analysis of the FDA Preamble, in which the court
determined that the preamble itself did not carry preemptive weight.10 9
II.

THE PREEMPTION DEBATE: THE STATE OF THE ISSUE

As the above conflicting interpretations between the regulatory
compliance statutes indicate, scholars and courts are relatively divided on
the issue of whether or not preemption should apply in the pharmaceutical
context. This part explores the arguments for and against preemption
coming from a variety of sources. Part II.A addresses arguments from
courts and commentators in favor of preemption, while Part II.B addresses
arguments against preemption.
A. Arguments for Preemptionfrom Courts and Commentators
The FDA, as a federal agency, is amply empowered and able to regulate
and monitor the pharmaceutical drug market. Indeed, it is effective to the
point that state tort law interference in policing the pharmaceutical market
is not only unnecessary, it is counterproductive to the Agency's effective
operation.11 0 As detailed below, preemption in the pharmaceutical context
is the best way to ensure the optimal performance of the FDA.

105. McDarby, 949 A.2d at 251 (quoting Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 529 A.2d 1176, 1196
(N.J. 1991)).
106. Id. at 252 (explaining why the labeling sought by the plaintiff is not in conflict with

the provisions of the preamble because "a sponsor is permitted to add risk information to the
FPI [full prescribing information] without first obtaining FDA approval.., and the labeling

remains subject to enforcement action if the added information makes the labeling false or
misleading").

107. Id. at 253 (internal quotation marks omitted).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 253-54.
110. W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationalefor the FDA Regulatory ComplianceDefense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.

1437, 1480 (1994) ("Tort law in the pharmaceutical context has proven to be an
extraordinarily expensive regime that suffers from institutional constraints limiting its
accuracy.... [W]here the manufacturer has complied with the FDCA and its implementing

regulations, tort law does not appear to have significant ability to generate safer drugs.").
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Part II.A.1 explains why the preemptive weight of federal regulations
means that congressional silence on the issue is irrelevant. Part II.A.2
discusses the effective and efficient nature of the FDA. Part II.A.3
addresses the FDA's competency as an institution. Finally, Part II.A.4
explains why FDA standards should not be questioned in state courts.
1. Irrelevance of Congressional Silence
on
Undoubtedly, the MDA only refers to "medical devices" and is silent 11
'
products.
pharmaceutical
to
afforded
be
should
effect
what preemptive
for
regulations
the
FDA
granting
for
argument
As a result, the strongest
112
prescription drugs preemptive force comes from the FDA Preamble.
However, the question becomes "whether it is appropriate to defer to an
The Supreme Court has long
agency statement in a preamble."' 113
have no less preemptive
regulations
"federal
advocated the position that
114
Stephen Breyer in his
Lohr,
Justice
In
statutes."
federal
than
effect
preemptive intent,"'1 15
of
sources
relevant
for
net
wide
a
"cast
concurrence
including ."regulations, preambles, interpretative statements, and responses
designated
to comments,' as well as through the exercise of its explicitly
1 16
pre-emption."
from
requirements
state
exempt
to
power
Some commentators do not see congressional silence on the
pharmaceutical front as a problem at all. 1 17 As observed by W. Wylie
Blair, in enacting the MDA, Congress was responding to a specific concern
related directly to medical devices, not to prescription drugs. 1 18 Blair goes
on to argue that,
[T]he inclusion of an express preemption clause does not equate to an
intent to exclude preemption of prescription drug tort suits . . . . An
equally plausible interpretation is that, if Congress had the opportunity to
speak directly on the issue of FDA's approval of prescription drugs, an
express preemption clause would be included .... 119

111. 21 U.S.C. § 360(e), (g) (2000).
112. See supra Part I.A.3.
113. Sharkey, supranote 1, at 1040.
114. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
("We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well
as by federal statutes."). For a general discussion of Hillsborough County, Florida v.
Automated Medical Laboratories,Inc. and its progeny, see Davis, supra note 29, at 111520, which discusses modem implied preemption cases.
115. Sharkey, supra note 1, at 1040.
116. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996) (Breyer, J. concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment) (quoting Hillsborough,471 U.S. at 718).
117. See Blair, supra note 21, at 296; Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt
Tort Litigation: A Critique of Chevron Defense and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J.
TORT L. 5 (2006).

118. Blair, supra note 21, at 296.
119. Id.
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However, "[e]ven if Congress did not intend to preempt the claim[s]"
against drug manufacturers,
"the intent of the FDA could provide grounds
20
for preemption" alone. 1
Furthermore, scholars have urged the importance of keeping in mind
distinctions between express and implied conflict preemption.121
"Congress undeniably has shown that it intends ordinary conflictpreemption principles to apply to [the] FDA's actions under the FDCA.
Section 202 of the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA . . . expressly
invalidates any state law that creates a 'direct and positive conflict' with
any amendments to the FDCA."' 12 2 Working from such grounds, scholars
argue that the FDA Preamble should be given
preemptive effect because of
12 3
the provisions of the Supremacy Clause.
2. Effective and Efficient Nature of the FDA
As noted by the Supreme Court in Buckman, the FDA is extensively
involved in every step of the approval process. 124 Every manufacturer
seeking FDA approval for a new product must submit a large volume of
information to the FDA to aid in the Agency's meticulous determination of
safety. 125 Through this entire "new drug application" (NDA) process, the
FDA is "required to exercise its scientific judgment to determine the kind
and quantity of data and information an applicant is required to provide for
a particular drug to meet the statutory standards." 12 6 Indeed, the application
process requires the submission of "full reports of investigations which
127
have been made to show whether or not such [a] drug is safe for use."
This rigorous "premarket approval" (PMA) process requires that the
"[m]anufacturer . . . submit detailed information regarding the safety and
efficacy of their devices, which the FDA then reviews, spending an average
of 1,200 hours on each submission."' 2 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
viewed the FDA's process as so effective that one of its central concerns
expressed in Buckman was not to hinder this "speedy" and effective
process. 129

120. Id. at 297.
121. Dorfman et al., supra note 23, at 609.
122. Id. (quoting Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 779,
793).

123. Id. at 610 ("Even though the Preamble is a regulatory advisory opinion.., the
Supremacy Clause requires courts to give full deference to FDA labeling determinations,

including its interpretation that the regulations provide both a floor and a ceiling and
therefore preempt contrary state law.").
124.
125.
126.
(2007).
127.

Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348-51 (2001).
See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006).
Approval of an Application and an Abbreviated Application, 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c)
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1); Buckman, 531 U.S. at 344 ("[A]n application must include all

known reports pertaining to the device's safety and efficacy ...
128. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
129. See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351. The Court held that

.
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Notably, several other courts considering the Buckman concerns have
determined that maintaining the efficiency and effectiveness of the FDA
approval process was a paramount concern of the Supreme Court. For
example, the District Court of Texas in Ledbetter, in concluding that the
statutory exception was federally preempted, stated that "[t]he logic of
Buckman was that the FDA promulgates detailed data submission
requirements and is fully empowered to investigate wrongful withholding
by manufacturers."' 130 The court went on to articulate the Buckman Court's
it
concern that "manufacturers might 'deluge' the FDA with information
131
neither needed nor wanted in order to defend state tort claims."'
In an effort to protect the integrity of this process and the health and
safety of the American public, the FDA has the power to conduct its own
independent examinations and investigations for all NDAs 132 and is
similarly empowered with the requisite tools to punish and deter instances
of fraud and misrepresentation against itself as soon as such problems
arise. 133 To that end, the FDA has established its own enforcement policy
of premarket submissions, which articulates available remedies. 134 Thus,
the FDA is aptly equipped to make a "measured response to suspected
fraud" perpetuated upon it. 135 However, if a citizen is concerned about an
instance of uninvestigated fraud, she is statutorily empowered to report that
13 6
wrongdoing and petition the Agency to take action.
Likewise, while the Supreme Court has recognized the traditional role of
the states in guarding the health and safety of its citizens, 137 it has been

adamant in declaring that "[p]olicing fraud against federal agencies is
fraud-on-the-FDA claims would also cause applicants to fear that their disclosures
to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by the Administration, will later be
judged insufficient in state court. Applicants would then have an incentive to
submit a deluge of information that the Administration neither wants nor needs,
resulting in additional burdens on the FDA's evaluation of an application. As a
result, the comparatively speedy... process could encounter delays ....
Id.
130. Ledbetter v. Merck & Co., Nos. 2005-59499, 2005-58543, 2007 WL 1181991, at
*5-6 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris County Apr. 19, 2007).
131. Id. at *6 (noting that "[t]he Buckman concern of deluging the FDA could well come
true if manufacturers were forced to make data submissions defensively in order to ensure
that the presumption of the Texas Act remained in place").
132. 21 U.S.C. § 372.
133. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (allowing the FDA to criminally pursue and
punish a wrongdoer who falsifies information); 21 U.S.C. § 332 (allowing FDA to address
fraud against itself by seeking civil penalties in the form of injunctive relief); Id. § 355(e)(5)
(allowing the FDA to withdraw drug approval if it is discovered that the manufacturer
falsified or misrepresented information in its New Drug Application (NDA)).
134. See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDE § 120.100 (1991),

availableat http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance-ref/cpg/cpggenl/cpgl 20-100.html.
135. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 349 (2001) ("In addition to
the general criminal proscription on making false statements to the Federal Government, the
FDA may respond to fraud by seeking injunctive relief, civil penalties, seizing the device,
and pursuing criminal prosecutions." (citations omitted)).
136. 21 U.S.C. § 372.
137. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
the "historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety").
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hardly 'a field which the States have traditionally occupied."" 1 38 Indeed,
the Court has considered the interference of the states in such federal
regulation to be unnecessary since "the federal statutory scheme amply
empowers the FDA to punish and deter fraud against the Administration,
and... this authority is used by the Administration to achieve a somewhat
139
delicate balance of statutory objectives."'
3. The FDA's Institutional Competency to Conduct a Cost/Benefit
Analysis for Mass Market Drugs
The FDA determination about an NDA is premised on a cost/benefit
analysis, 14 0 which the FDA alone possesses the institutional competency to
conduct. Indeed, the Supreme Court has exhibited concern that state
policies do not hinder the "comparatively speedy" and effective process of
the FDA. 14 1 Any requirements that states might want to impose on
manufacturers, in addition to those required by the Agency, could result in
42
an overburdening of the Agency, impairing its proper functioning.1
Moreover, the fact that the FDA leaves drugs on the market that have
some adverse side effects is not indicative of the fact that the FDA is absent
from regulating drugs once they are on the market.' 43 Often the FDA will
leave drugs on the market even if they do cause risks because there are no
44
safer product alternatives that produce the same level of benefit.1
This cost/benefit consideration is especially necessary because all of the
ill effects of a drug are not immediately apparent at the clinical level. Thus,
the FDA requires meticulous reporting 14 5 on the effects of a drug once it is
being used in society 146 and requires removal of the drug from the market if
a manufacturer refuses to comply.' 47 Indeed, the FDA has asserted that
"permitting jury verdicts based on approved labeling will encourage
manufacturers to warn physicians of unsubstantiated risks [which will]

138. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947)).
139. Id. at 348.
140, Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2075
(2000).

141. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351.
142. Id. (noting that "fraud-on-the FDA claims would ... cause applicants to fear that
their disclosures to the FDA, although deemed appropriate by the Administration, will later
be judged insufficient in state court [thus causing them] . . . to submit a deluge of
information that the Administration neither wants nor needs, resulting in additional burdens
on the FDA's evaluation of an application").
143. See Epstein, supra note 117, at 23.
144. See id.
145. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b) (2004) (requiring the reporting of information from "any
source, foreign or domestic, including information derived from commercial marketing
experience, postmarketing
clinical investigations, postmarketing epidemiological/
surveillance studies, reports in the scientific literature, and unpublished scientific papers").

146. Id.
147. Id. § 314.800).
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negatively impact medical treatment," thus
upsetting the careful cost/benefit
148
balance that the FDA tries to maintain.
Far from overly careful in its regulation, the FDA has been criticized as
too stringent in its scrutiny of drugs, which sometimes results in beneficial
drugs being kept off of
the market because they do not pass the Agency's
49
costibenefit analysis. 1
4. No State Court Questioning of FDA Standards

The FDA itself has explicitly said that its regulations are meant to
achieve optimal safety. 150

Indeed, the FDA has made it abundantly clear

15 1
"that its stamp of approval should preempt state tort law claims."'

Indeed, when Scott Gottlieb, the FDA's Deputy Commissioner for Medical
and Scientific Affairs, spoke on the issue of the supremacy of FDA
standards, he stated,
We think that if your company complies with the FDA processes, if you
bring forward the benefits and risks of your drug, and let your information
be judged through a process with highly trained scientists, you should not
be second-guessed by state courts that don't have the same scientific
52
knowledge. 1

Furthermore, as noted by Howard Dorfman and his colleagues, the FDA has

stressed that certain "'[r]isk minimization measures, such as labeling
warnings and market withdrawal, may actually present substantial
' 153
disadvantages. More warnings can discourage appropriate product use.'
Dorfman goes on to discuss the Motus v. Pfizer, Inc. case where the U.S.
Department of Justice filed an amicus brief explaining the importance of the
fact that the "FDA considered and rejected the inclusion of an additional

warning relating to suicide in the [drug's] labeling as scientifically
untenable and, therefore, a state tort law-required suicide warning would
154
result in misbranding of the drug in violation of federal regulations."'

148. Davis, supra note 29, at 1135.
149. See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DuKE L.J. 607, 625 ("By
delaying the entry of beneficial drugs into the market, the Food and Drug Administration has
dramatically increased risks to life and health in some settings."); see also Abigail E. Rosen,
Note, Analysis of an FDA Compliance Defensefor PharmaceuticalTort Litigation, 1 N.Y.U.
J. L. & Bus. 241, 247 (2004).
150. See Epstein, supra note 117, at 23 ("Another misunderstanding ... is that FDA
labeling requirements represent a minimum safety standard. In fact, FDA interprets the act
to establish both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling'...." (citing Requirements on Content and Format
of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922,
3934-35 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2007)))).
151. Blair, supra note 21, at 297.
152. Marc Kaufman, FDA Tries to Limit Suits in State Courts: Agency's "Federal
Preemption" Policy Included in Labeling Guidelinesfor Medications, WASH. POST, Jan. 19,
2006, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/
18/AR2006011802320.html.
153. Dorfman et al., supra note 23, at 592 (citation omitted).
154. Id. In the briefs in Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., the FDA went on to assert that preemption
was required for two reasons: (1) allowing a claim that the defendant should have provided
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The courts are split in their responsiveness to the institutional
competency argument.155 Notably, however, some courts, such as those in
Michigan, have determined that deferring to the sound judgment of
regulatory agencies is a primary goal of the regulatory compliance statutes.
For example, as articulated by the Michigan Supreme Court in
consideration of the constitutionality of the state's regulatory compliance
statute,
[T]his statute only establishes that a determination of independent
significance, here the FDA finding that a drug is safe and effective, will
be the measure in Michigan of whether the duty of reasonable care has
been met by a drug manufacturer or seller in a tort case .... [T]he FDA,

simply
for its own reasons that are independent of Michigan tort law,156
makes a factual finding regarding the safety and efficacy of drugs.
Indeed, as commentators have suggested, the propreemption position
"strike[s] just the right balance between protecting consumers from harmful
products and preserving manufacturers' ability to sell therapeutic
products-including those with known health and safety risks and side
effects."' 157 From that basis, the presumption in the drug context should be
in favor of federal preemption, for that is the only way to preserve this
58
delicate balance.1
Furthermore, some courts have concluded that the "exceptions" to fraud
on the FDA interfere with the efficiency of the Agency and should just be
severed from the statute as a whole. 159 The dominant case in this line of
alternative warnings other than those required by the FDA would require a manufacturer to
choose between tort liability or compliance with the FDCA, and (2) "' imposition of liability
on the basis of a failure to warn would thwart the FDCA's objectives of ensuring a drug's
optimal use by requiring that manufacturers disseminate only truthful information as to its
effects."' Id. (quoting Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of Defendant-Appellee
and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court's Order Denying Partial
Summery Judgment of Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 14-15, Motus v. Pfizer,
Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (Nos. 02-55372, 02-55498)). For a thorough discussion of
Motus, see Davis, supra note 29, at 1095-98.
155. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 525 (E.D. Pa. 2006). But see
Perry v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 685 (E.D. Pa. 2006). For a comparison
of these two cases, see Davis, supranote 29, at 1098-99.
156. Taylor v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 658 N.W.2d 127, 134 (Mich. 2003). Taylor v.
Smithkline Beecham Corp. marks the only time that the Michigan Supreme Court has
examined the state's regulatory compliance statute. In that case, the plaintiffs, who suffered
injuries resulting from use of the Fen-phen diet drug, sought to establish that the regulatory
compliance statute violated the state constitution. Id. at 130. The court upheld the
constitutionality of the statute and found for the defendant, holding that the statute provided
an "absolute defense to a products liability claim if the drug and its labeling were in
compliance with the FDA's approval at the time the drug left the control of the
manufacturer." Id. at 131.
157. Robert R. Gasaway, The Problem of FederalPreemption: Reformulating the Black
Letter Rules, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 25, 36 (2005).
158. See id.
159. See Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2004); Ledbetter v. Merck
& Co., Nos. 2005-59499, 2005-58543, 2007 WL 1181991, at *7-8 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Harris
County Apr. 19, 2007).
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reasoning is Garcia, in which the Sixth Circuit, interpreting the Michigan
statute,1 60 concluded that, insofar as the statute required plaintiffs to
independently prove fraud on the FDA, it was preempted under federal
law. 16 1 However, the court went on to determine that this partially
invalidated fraud exception could be severed from the remainder of the
immunity statute. This would preserve the regulatory compliance portion
while removing the exception that conflicted with Buckman. 162 The court
reasoned that if the Michigan legislature were "given a choice between
immunity absent a finding of bribery or fraud by the Federal Government
163
and no immunity, the ... [l]egislature would prefer the former option."'
Thus, the court deferred entirely to the sound judgment of the Agency in
concluding that instances of fraud could be brought to light in subsequent
trials if, and only if, the FDA had in fact made a prior determination that
64
such fraud had occurred.
B. Arguments Against Preemptionfrom Courtsand Commentators

Having preemption apply across the board would interfere with the
delicate balance of state and federal interests and trample on the traditional
constitutional powers of the states-namely ensuring the health and safety
of its citizens. Indeed, legislatures that have adopted regulatory compliance
statutes (particularly those worded very broadly) have placed their citizens
1 65
in the dubious position of not being able to seek redress for their injuries.
Some commentators argue that preemption should not apply broadly to
these pharmaceutical drugs because the FDA has exhibited an inability to
effectively monitor drugs and thus the states need to take individual actions
to protect the health and safety of their citizens.

160. See supra Part I.D.1.
161. Garcia,385 F.3d at 965.
162. Id. at 967 ("[S]evering the preemption exemptions will not give license to drug
manufacturers to use bribery or fraud as a means of obtaining FDA approval, then [allow
them to] rely on that approval as a shield from products liability: it will merely place
responsibility for prosecuting bribery or fraud on the FDA in the hands of the Federal
Government rather than state courts.").
163. Id.
164. Id. at 966. Another, more recent case with a similar, though more limited line of
reasoning, is Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008). In Colacicco, the U.S
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit looked at the very narrow issue of circumstances in
which the FDA has publicly rejected the need for heightened warnings on pharmaceutical
products, and concluded that, when the Agency had made such a definitive judgment, its
conclusion was not to be questioned by state courts. Id.
165. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 90-91 (noting that the result of what the
Michigan legislature did is that "residents injured by .dangerous drugs like Vioxx are
prevented from pursuing claims against the manufacturers").
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1. Congress's Explicit Removal of Pharmaceutical Drugs from the Ambit
of Preemption
The MDA is specific in its grant of preemptive force only for "medical
devices"-not for prescription drugs. 166 Indeed, the statutory language
indicates that Congress did not intend for the FDCA to occupy the field of
pharmaceutical regulation to the point that it would impliedly preempt state
claims. 16 7 As noted by McDonald v. Ortho PharmaceuticalCorp., "[t]he
regulatory history of the FDA requirements belies any objective to cloak
them with preemptive effect."' 168 Indeed, Congress has in the past adopted
found to be particularly
a FDA compliance defense for products that it has
69
beyond the purview of state tort considerations. 1
Moreover, the presumption against preemption should continue to apply
in areas that are traditionally within the state police powers: notably
ensuring the health and safety of its citizens.1 70 As the Supreme Court
articulated, "[P]articularly in [instances] in which Congress has 'legislated
...in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' we 'start with
the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
17
purpose of Congress.' 1
Working from this premise, the Second Circuit, interpreting the Michigan
statute, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and found that no part of the statute
should be federally preempted. 172
In Desiano, the Second Circuit
concluded that where there is such a clear state interest "to regulate and
restrict when victims could continue to recover under preexisting state
products liability law," the consideration falls squarely within the
traditional regulatory powers of the state. 173 The Second Circuit also
emphasized the significance of congressional silence on the issue,
observing that "[u]ntil and unless Congress states explicitly that it intends
invalidation of state common law claims merely because issues of fraud

166. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
167. See Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118
(2008); M. Stuart Madden, FederalPreemption of Inconsistent State Safety Obligations, 21
PACE L. REV. 103, 138-39 (2000).
168. McDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 70 (Mass. 1985) (rejecting the
manufacturer's preemption defense).
169. In 1986, the notable products in this area were childhood vaccines. See 42 U.S.C. §§
300aa-22(b), 300aa-23(d); Noah, supra note 33, at 957.
170. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (finding that the plaintiffs
claim was, at heart, not based on any sort of fraud-on-the-agency theory, but on traditional
state tort law principles of the duty of care owed by the manufacturer); see also Buckman v.
Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 352 (1991).
171. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (Kennedy, J.,concurring)
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (alteration in original).
172. For a discussion of the circuit split, see supra Part I.D. 1.
173. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2006).
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statutes like
may arise in the trial of such claims, we decline to read general
174
the FDCA and the MDA as having [preemptive] effect."'
Several courts have adopted this position, notably, the Superior Court of
New Jersey. In McDarby, the court, considering the current judicial
175
landscape of federal preemption and looking to New Jersey precedent,
determined that Congress did not intend to preempt state tort law in failure
to warn cases for pharmaceuticals, and affirmed the district court's ruling
for the plaintiff.' 76 In finding there was no statutory preemption, the court
concluded that "granting immunity to a drug manufacturer from liability in
[failure-to-warn] circumstance[s] would 'conflict with Congress' wellwhich was the protection of
recognized purpose in enacting the FDCA,"'
77
consumers from dangerous products. 1
Furthermore, commentators discourage an extension and enlargement of
Buckman principles, noting that "Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation over the matter in question." 17 8 Thomas McGarity speaks
extensively on the "weak link" in the Buckman decision, which he
concludes is the notion that "Congress believed that federal agencies are byand-large willing and able to police fraud against themselves."' 179 To the
contrary, McGarity argues that congressional silence in this area is
extremely relevant and notes "one should not lightly presume a
congressional determination that the federal government is sufficiently
fraud without the reinforcing incentives that state
capable of dealing with
8°
provide."'
can
tort law
2. Inability of FDA to Conduct the Approval Process Properly
The inability of the FDA to conduct the approval process in an effective
and efficient manner is exhibited in several respects. The first involves the
ease of manipulation of the regulatory process, which stems in part from the
misrepresentation and concealment of relevant scientific data from a
regulatory agency.181 Indeed, scholars have observed that there is a "strong
incentive for the regulatee to paint the most benign possible picture of the
product at the time" the application is submitted in order to obtain approval
to manufacture the product. 182 The most frequent instance of fraud
committed against an agency involves instances where entities withhold

174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 96.
See supra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
See McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
Id. at 55 (quoting Feldman v. Lederle Labs, 592 A.2d 1176, 1196 (1991)).

178. Thomas 0. McGarity, Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulationof the Regulatory
Process in the Law of Torts, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 549, 575 (2002).

179. Id. at 564.
180. Id.

181. See id. at 558-63 (noting that this problem especially affects "permit and licensing
regimes like those administered by the FDA for approving new drugs, medical devices and
food additives").
182. Id. at 558-59.
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relevant scientific data. 183 Often agencies are manipulated through false
reports and publications by "scientists" whose sole purpose in writing is the
distortion of the truth. 184 It has been argued that the "pervasiveness of
85
fraud undermines any theoretical soundness of regulatory preemption."'
186
Thus, instances of "[f]raud on the FDA should turn off preemption."'
Most troubling is that it appears that FDA concern about these problems
arises only periodically, when news of such manipulation results in public
outcry.187 These problems of misrepresentation "represent[] a serious threat
88
to the integrity of the federal regulatory process."1
Many scholars assert that even aside from instances of deception upon
the Agency, the FDA is incapable of effectively monitoring and scrutinizing
every drug before granting it mass-market approval. 189 Notably, scholars
take issue with the information that the Agency actually uses and to which
it has access. 190 Indeed, scholars note the irony of the fact that "the
advisory committees to which the FDA looks for guidance on scientific
questions have included researchers
paid by the manufacturer of the product
19 1
for committee consideration."'
3. FDA Inability to Regulate Approved Drugs Once They Enter the Market
One of the major flaws of the FDA concerns its inability to conduct
meaningful postmarket surveillance of the drugs it approves. 192 Many
commentators have noted that once a drug obtains FDA approval for sale,
the FDA no longer regulates the drug and merely takes reactionary
measures after problems with the drug become blatant.' 93 Some scholars
183. See id. at 559.
184. See id. at 562 ("Another way that a regulated industry can manipulate an agency is
by paying for scientific consultants to write critiques of scientific studies that indicate that
the industry's products may cause adverse health or environmental effects.").
185. Sharkey, supra note 65 (manuscript at 2) ("'A reasonable national public policy-in
the absence of fraud-would give a pharmaceutical manufacturer protection against tort
liability for failure to warn when the FDA had approved the accused warnings."' (quoting In
re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (Weinstein, J.)
(emphasis added))).
186. Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative
State, 1 J. TORT L. 4, 46-47 (2006) ("[A] showing of [fraud on the FDA] should suffice to
defeat the preemptive effect that a given FDA assessment of a device or drug otherwise
might have on garden-variety actions for products liability.").
187. McGarity, supra note 178, at 563.
188. Id.
189. See Nagareda, supra note 186, at 41 ("One central concern about the according of
preemptive force to regulatory action in any setting speaks to the information on which the
federal agency acts. Agencies have expertise in the subject areas in which they regulate, but
important information about those areas often rests outside of the agencies themselves.").
190. Id. at 42 (expressing a concern with "information within the control of industry").
191. See id. at 43-44; O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 85 ("Drug manufacturers
possess strong leverage in rejecting efforts by the FDA to strengthen warnings on labels.").
192. See Nagareda, supra note 186, at 17; Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort
System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J.
HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 587, 598-606 (2005).
193. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 85.
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have cited the FDA's emphasis on "rushing drugs to the market" 194 as a
major contributor to the compromised state of the Agency's regulative
abilities. 195
To support the claim that the FDA tends to rush drugs to market, scholars
frequently focus on the "fast track" approval process that the Agency
initiated in 1992 for certain medications. 196 The drugs that are considered
under this "fast track" process are evaluated for only six months before they
are approved for market use-a time period far too short to truly gauge the
effects that these drugs can have. 197 Indeed, Vioxx gained FDA approval
through such a fast track process, which, scholars argue, indicates the
FDA's severe lack of judgment in discerning which drugs should and
should not be considered for fast track approval. 198
Considering the rapidity with which scientific knowledge goes out of
date, the FDA's lack of scrutiny once the drug is on the market is
particularly troubling. 199
Part of this may result from the fact that
"[a]pproximately half [of] the FDA's drug evaluation budget comes directly

from pharmaceutical companies in the form of fees for expedited approval
of drugs," and some believe that these budgetary concerns have caused the
FDA to "lose control over the drug industry. ' 200 Additionally, because of
the speed of the entrance of new drugs into the market, "it becomes

increasingly difficult for the FDA to perform its other functions-including

monitoring drug safety, ensuring manufacturing standards, and regulating
20
marketing." 1
Scholars assert that far too frequently the FDA responds too slowly to
serious concerns reported about its approved drugs.20 2 Indeed, even when
the FDA officially recognizes the harmful effects of certain drugs, it seems
unwilling to rapidly withdraw those drugs from mass-market

194. See id. at 86.
195. See MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US

AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 209-10 (2004) ("As drugs enter the market faster, it becomes
increasingly difficult for the FDA to perform its other functions-including monitoring drug
safety, ensuring manufacturing standards, and regulating marketing."); O'Steen & O'Steen,
supra note 9, at 86.
196. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 86.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 86-87 ("The fast-track approval process was created to facilitate quick
approval of pharmaceuticals used for treatment of cancer, AIDS, and other life-threatening
conditions. It is doubtful that Congress intended the FDA to use this tool for a drug like
Vioxx, which was developed to relieve pain caused by arthritis.").
199. See Nagareda, supra note 186, at 47 ("Preemptive FDA action at a given time should
not operate as a get-out-of-jail-free card good forever, for any agency assessment of science
at a given time is merely a snapshot of a process in motion.").
200. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 85.
201. See ANGELL, supra note 195, at 210.
202. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 87 ("Many physicians and health care
providers blame the FDA for failing to warn the public of serious risks as evidence of the
harmful side effects of Vioxx began to accumulate.").

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 77

consumption. 20 3 With the FDA lacking the gumption to ensure public
safety above all else, scholars argues, state tort causes of action are
necessary to protect consumers from harmful drugs and to ensure that
manufacturers are deterred from releasing the drugs without adequate
204
testing.
4. Lack of FDA Resources to Set and Ensure Optimal Standards of Safety
The substantial lack of resources at the FDA's disposal heavily
contributes to its inability effectively to set and maintain such optimal
levels of safety. 20 5 Indeed, scholars exhibit criticism that the number of
resources available to the Agency hinder it from functioning effectively,
noting that "[a]s programs and responsibilities have increased, enforcement
budgets have not increased accordingly." 20 6 Many scholars take issue with
the fact that due to a lack of resources, the FDA's NDA process has been
streamlined such that it no longer focuses on ensuring optimal levels of
safety. 20 7 As noted by Michael D. Green, after the completion of his
comprehensive study on the Bendectin litigation, the "FDA does not have
the resources to monitor and ensure universal compliance of a large,
20 8
technologically complex, and informationally massive industry."
Professor McGarity also notes that the bioresearch monitoring program-an
FDA initiative responsible for conducting inspections of clinical
investigators-is so thinly staffed that in 1999, "the FDA inspected only
468 out of more than 14,000 clinical investigators actually conducting trials
during that time period. '20 9 McGarity goes on to discuss how this has been
a problem of the FDA since the 1990s and that as a result it has learned to
adapt to working with a severe lack of resources. 2 10 "Currently, the FDA
203. See id. at 88 (noting that the thirty-two-member advisory board of the FDA
recommended to return Vioxx to the market even after all members "unanimously agreed
that Vioxx 'significantly increases the risk of cardiovascular events' (quoting Celebrex,
Bextra, Vioxx Can Stay, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 18, 2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/
18/news/fortune500/merck-drugs/)).
204. See McGarity, supra note 178, at 567; O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 88.
205. McGarity, supra note 178, at 567.
206. Id. (noting the statement by "[a] high-level EPA enforcement official who
complained that '[t]he widening gap between government's compliance assurance mandate
and the resources it can apply to it means there will simply never be enough inspectors and
government attorneys to achieve significant levels of compliance through enforcement
actions alone' (quoting Clifford Rechtschaffen, Competing Visions: EPA and the States
Battle for the Future of Environmental Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,808, 10,810

(2000))).
207. See Rosen, supra note 149, at 254-55.
208. MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 342 (1996); see also McGarity,

supra note 178, at 568.
209. McGarity, supra note 178, at 568 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., SEMIANNUAL REPORT: APRIL 1, 2000-SEPTEMBER 30, 2000, at

51, availableat http://oig.hhs.gov/reading/semiannual/2000/00fsemi.pdf).
210. Id. at 568-69. Thomas McGarity writes,
In the early 1990s, the FDA launched what it characterized as an aggressive
"enforcement enhancement" campaign aimed at restoring the agency's "credibility
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lacks the resources to monitor drugs and their promotion after initial
21
approval." '
Additionally, a survey by the Union of Concerned Scientists found that
70% of FDA scientists who participated in the survey believed that the
2 12
Agency lacked the resources necessary to function properly.
Furthermore, 81% of those surveyed said that the Agency needed to
strengthen its oversight of drugs after they are approved for mass-market

distribution.

213

Courts have taken issue with the FDA's position articulated in the FDA
2 14
Preamble that state courts have an undermining effect on its authority.
For example, in Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the
District of Nebraska concluded that the preamble is not preclusive because
it was not adopted under appropriate administrative law polices nor was
215
there any public input in its adoption.
The district court in Nebraska is not alone in this conclusion, as the
Vermont Supreme Court also asserted (contrary to the preamble) that
"federal labeling requirements create a floor, not a ceiling, for state
regulation." 2 16 The Vermont Supreme Court in Levine noted that the FDA
cannot possibly be considered to be setting optimal standards when the
FDA "allows a drug's manufacturer to alter the drug's label without prior

FDA approval when necessary"-a common practice, indicating the total
lack of FDA supervision over the final warning label. 2 17

"The FDA's

and integrity." Budgetary constraints, however, continued to plague the agency
throughout the 1990s. At the same time, Congress added to the FDA's
responsibilities without increasing its enforcement resources. Agency officials
have acknowledged that they will have "to do more with less" in exercising its
enforcement authorities. In fact, the FDA, in the mid-1990s, argued in court that
constraints on enforcement resources justified a decision to shirk its statutory
responsibilities to promulgate regulations under the recently enacted Nutrition
Labeling and Education Act of 1990.
Id. (citations omitted).
211. Mitchell Oates, FacilitatingInformed Medical Treatment Through Production and
Disclosure of Research into Off-Label Uses of Pharmaceuticals,80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1272,
1300 (2005) (discussing the insufficient resources at the FDA to monitor postapproval uses
since the primary focus of the Agency is new drug approval).
212. Jonathan D. Rockoff, FDA Scientists Blast Agency's Priorities, S.F. CHRON., July
21, 2006, at A6.
213. Id.
214. See Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Neb. 2006); McDarby v.
Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).
215. Jackson, 432 F. Supp. 2d. at 968 & n.3 (noting that "[t]he FDA failed to comply
with its requirements to communicate with the states and to allow the states an opportunity
to participate in the proceedings prior to a preemption decision").
216. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 184 (Vt. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1118
(2008).
217. See id. at 185 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2004)). In Levine, the Vermont
Supreme Court quoted the relevant part of the FDA regulation, which provides,
(6) The agency may designate a category of changes for the purpose of providing
that, in the case of a change in such category, the holder of an approved
application may commence distribution of the drug product involved upon receipt
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approved label . . . can therefore be said to set the minimum labeling
requirement, and not necessarily the ultimate label where a manufacturer
improves the label to promote greater safety. ' 2 18 Thus, "[s]ection 314.70(c)
allows, and arguably encourages, manufacturers to add and strengthen
warnings that, despite FDA approval, are insufficient to protect
consumers." 2 19 The threat of state tort liability "simply give[s] these
manufacturers a concrete incentive to take this action as quickly as
220
possible."
Further still, the New Jersey Superior Court has also joined this position1
22
by asserting that the FDA Preamble does not carry preemptive weight.
In McDarby, the New Jersey Superior Court articulated five reasons for
denying the preamble preemptive effect: 222 (1) presumption against
preemption in fields of traditional state dominance; (2) absence of any
requirement of deference under principals articulated by numerous Supreme
Court precedents addressing the subject of preemption; (3) the failure of the
regulations to provide notice and opportunity for comment; (4) the conflict
between the preamble and longstanding FDA policy; and (5) the trampling
223
effect of the preamble on the state's police powers.
Great emphasis overall is thus placed on the federal government not
"cavalierly pre-empt[ing]" aspects of governance traditionally within the
province of state authority. 224 As the issues here relate fundamentally to
powers traditionally reserved to the states, the state should be able to
regulate drug manufacturers through statute.
III. APPLYING PREEMPTION
Part III proceeds in three sections: Part III.A argues that the FDA is fully
capable of ensuring that pharmaceutical products are safe for public use.
by the agency of a supplement for the change. These changes include, but are not
limited to:
(iii) Changes in the labeling.., to accomplish any of the following:
(A) To add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction ...[or]

(C) To add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration
that is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product ....
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6).
218. Levine, 944 A.2d at 186 (quoting McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286 JBS,
2005 WL 3752269, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2005)).
219. Id.
220. Id.

221. See McDarby v. Merck & Co., 949 A.2d 223, 253-54 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2008).

222. The court actually articulates six reasons for denying preemptive weight to the
preamble, but the sixth ("the absence of any actual conflict between the FDCA or FDA
regulations and plainitffs' failure-to-warn cause of action") is specific to the precise facts of
McDarby v. Merck & Co. and thus omitted here. See id. at 254-55.
223. Id.
224. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,485 (1996).
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Part III.B argues that exceptions to regulatory compliance statutes should be
preempted because they conflict with agency objectives. Finally, part III.C
argues that the specific wording of each of the statutes must be scrutinized
against the backdrop of the Buckman principles.
A. The FDA's Capabilityto Ensure Safety
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions advocated the position
that "federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal
statutes." 225 Furthermore, not only has the Court articulated sound ground
for finding that the FDA regulation of pharmaceuticals preempts state tort
law causes of action, but the Agency has expressly stated such a position in
the 2006 preamble. 2 26 Courts that have ignored the preemptive weight that
should be accorded to this Agency statement are acting in direct opposition
to the furtherance of the Agency's objectives and thus hinder its efficient
228
operation, 2 27 even when they declare that they are not.
Thus, despite the Supreme Court's recent deadlock on the issue, there is
good reason to give the Agency's determinations preemptive effect in this
area, primarily because it is in the best position to evaluate all of the
considered factors about whether to market (or keep on the market) any
given drug. 229 While critics argue that the FDA is actually ineffective in
ensuring the health and safety of the public, 230 these are all hindsight
critiques that fail to consider the careful cost/benefit analysis that the
Agency conducted.
The institutional competency of the FDA should not be second-guessed
by juries, who do not possess the same scientific knowledge that the FDA
had when it made its determination about the safety of the drug. 23 1 Having
the sound judgment of the FDA questioned at the state level would destroy
the Agency's goals of pursuing a cost/benefit analysis with respect to the
225. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)

("We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well
as by federal statutes.").
226. See supra Part I.A.3.
227. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 n.7 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. §
201.56 (2007)); see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 341-42
(2001); supra Part I.A.3.
228. See McDarby, 949 A.2d at 234. In McDarby the court found, in part, that the state
cause of action could not be preempted because the state statute did not affect "'the balance
of risks and benefits set by the FDA when it approves a drug label."' Id. at 253 (quoting
David A. Kessler & David C. Vlacleck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to
Preempt Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 465 (2008)). Additionally, when the
court enumerated its factors for not giving preemptive weight to the preamble, the final
factor was incredibly fact-specific to the case. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
These two elements, taken together, suggest that perhaps the court could find preemption if
the FDA declared that the balance of risks and benefits was upset or in any other factually
dissimilar situation.
229. See supra Part II.A.3.
230. See supra Part II.B.3.
231. See supra Part II.A.3.
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products that it maintains on the market. 232 Thus the careful cost/benefit
consideration that the Agency conducts would be rendered useless if it
could be abrogated by juries that are sympathetic to the plight of the injured
plaintiff.233 Additionally, allowing the states to weigh in on the discussion
about what is adequate representation to the FDA would "dramatically
increase the burdens facing potential applicants," which might discourage
them from seeking FDA approval for a universally beneficial drug. 234
Moreover, the Supreme Court has praised the FDA approval process
numerous times for being not only efficient but also effective. 235 Indeed, in
Buckman, the Court indicated that one of its central reasons for finding
preemption was the concern that if additional state tort requirements were
added to the current FDA requirements they might overburden the
236
industry.
Granted, instances of fraud present a difficult situation, because as a
result of the misrepresentation, the FDA did not have the proper basis of
knowledge to make an accurate determination. 237 However, the FDA is
adequately empowered to effectively police and monitor the integrity of the
pharmaceutical production process and to punish and deter fraud without
state intervention. 2 38 Moreover, the states should not be allowed to judge
the adequacy or inadequacy of disclosures made to the FDA, but rather such
a task must remain in the sound discretion of the Agency.
This Note agrees with the Sixth Circuit and Professor Sharkey in
concluding that the FDA should take a more aggressive role in prosecuting
such fraud. 239 Once the FDA has independently made the determination
that fraud exists, the states are then in a better position to allow private
litigants to seek personal redress. 240 However, without that determination,
Buckman's concerns are implicated-notably, if states are pursuing causes
of action against manufacturers without independent findings of fraud, then
the states act outside the traditional purview of their police powers. 24 1 It is
the FDA's role (not that of the states) to determine what kind of information
it needs from the manufacturer and whether such necessary information was
misrepresented or withheld from it.242 Once the FDA has made this
determination, then the states can use that prior conclusion to redress the
232. See supra Part II.A.3.
233. See supra Part II.A.3.
234. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 350-51 (2001) (noting that

"[a]s a practical matter, complying with the FDA's detailed regulatory regime in the shadow
of 50 States' torts regimes will dramatically increase the burdens facing potential
applicants").
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See supraPart I.B.3.
Buckman, 531 U.S. at 350.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347-50.
See Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961, 967 (6th Cir. 2004); Sharkey,

supra note 65 (manuscript at 7).
240. See Sharkey, supra note 65 (manuscript at 7).
241. See supra Part II.A.2.
242. See supra Part II.A.2.
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Indeed, this position has not

escaped the notice of the Court; it was precisely the position that Justice
2 44

Stevens articulated in his concurrence in Buckman.
This issue stands poised for Supreme Court consideration in the near
future. 24 5 At that later date, the Court should reevaluate the sound view
articulated by Justice Stevens in Buckman and consider it to be a middle
ground approach of preventing the states from policing Agency fraud, while

allowing citizens private causes of action after such fraud has been
positively determined by the Agency. 246 Adopting such a position strikes a

balance between conflicting state and federal interests as expressed by the
opponents of federal preemption.

247

B. Exceptions to Regulatory Compliance Statutes in Conflict with Agency
Objectives
This Note argues that, because of the institutional competency of the
FDA, exceptions in regulatory compliance statutes should be struck from
the statute, as advocated by the Sixth Circuit. 24 8 The Sixth Circuit, looking
at the relevant Michigan statute, concluded that this was the proper choice
because it conformed to legislative intent. 249
The Sixth Circuit's
interpretation was more sound than the Second Circuit's, primarily because
the Second Circuit ignored Buckman's concern that the efficient functioning
2 50
of the Agency should not be hindered.
While Judge Guido Calabresi of the Second Circuit in Desiano premised
his conclusion on three central points, 25 1 all of them dismiss the central
concern of Buckman:
notably the adverse impact that state law

243. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying notes (discussing Garcia).
244. Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 354 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("This would be a different case if, prior to the instant litigation, the FDA had
determined that petitioner had committed fraud during the [approval] process ....
Under
those circumstances, respondent's state-law fraud claim would not depend upon speculation
as to the FDA's behavior in a counterfactual situation but would be grounded in the agency's
explicit actions. In such a case, a plaintiff would be able to establish causation without
second-guessing the FDA's decision-making or overburdening its personnel, thereby
alleviating the Government's central concerns regarding fraud-on-the agency claims.").
245. Levine is currently being considered by the Supreme Court and should be decided
shortly after this Note's publication. See Wyeth v. Levine, 128 S. Ct. 1118 (2008).
246. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
247. See Sharkey, supra note 65 (manuscript at 7).
248. See supra note 81-84 (discussing Garcia v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 385 F.3d 961 (6th
Cir. 2004)).
249. Garcia, 385 F.3d at 967.
250. "State-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims inevitably conflict with the FDA's
responsibility to police fraud ... "Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341,
350 (2001). Additionally, the Court feared that a potential overburdening of the FDA would
occur, since applicants might begin to fear that their FDA disclosures were not sufficient and
thus would want to "submit a deluge of information that the Administration neither wants
nor needs." Buckman, 531 U.S. at 351; see also supraPart I.D. 1.
251. For a discussion of the tenets of the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, see Part I.D. 1.
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determinations of fraud-on-the-FDA could have on the FDA's internal
operations and the regulatory process as a whole. 252 The Second Circuit's
holding threatens to upset the "equilibrium" that the Garcia court strikes
between state and federal interests by adopting a narrow reading of
253
Buckman that forecloses only stand-alone fraud-on-the-FDA claims.
Of the three statutes on which this Note focuses, Michigan's most clearly
violates Buckman's principles because it most clearly references fraudulent
activity. Notably, it requires that the manufacturer "intentionally withhold[]
from or misrepresent[] [information] to the [FDA]. ' '254 Furthermore, the
Michigan statute requires not only a finding of intentionality on the part of
the manufacturer,
but also a finding that the Agency relied on the
2 55
misinformation.
In providing a rebuttable presumption, the Texas statute varies slightly
256
from the blanket immunity that the Michigan statute purports to give.
The Texas statute varies from the Michigan statute in that it does not
require such a finding of intentionality. 257 Moreover, the Texas statute,
unlike the Michigan statute, does not require any finding of reliance on the
part of the FDA. 258 Despite the lack of intentionality and reliance, the
Texas court interprets its own statute to be indistinguishable in intent and
purpose from the Michigan statute and hence implicates the concerns of
Buckman.2 59 Indeed, such a finding was appropriate, as the Supreme Court
has indicated that the proper focus is on the legislative intent behind the
260
statute.
Finally, the New Jersey statute differs from the other two statutes in that
it does not provide broad protection for the manufacturer in compliance
with FDA regulations but rather just protects them narrowly against a
punitive damages judgment. 2 61 While the New Jersey statute does not
require a standard of intentionality, it does require a lesser standard of
"knowingly with[holding] . . . information" on the part of the
manufacturer. 262 Additionally, while not requiring a finding of reliance on
the part of the FDA, the New Jersey statute requires that the withheld
2 63
information be causally related to the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
252. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
253. Sharkey, supra note 65 (manuscript at 10).
254. MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2946(5)(a) (West 2000).
255. Id. ("[T]he drug would not have been approved, or the [FDA] would have withdrawn

approval for the drug if the information were accurately submitted.").
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See supra Part I.D.2.
See supra Part I.D. 1-2.
See supra Part I.D.2.
See supra Part I.D.2.
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996).
See supra Part I.D.3.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 2000).

263. Id. Several other states have regulatory compliance statutes that, like New Jersey's,
protect against punitive damages, require a standard of "knowledge," and require that the
defect in the manufacturer's product be casually related to the plaintiffs injury. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701(b) (2003); OR. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 30.927(2) (West 2003); UTAH
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C. The Differences Among the Statutes and the ProperInterpretationof
Buckman
To date, no court has pinned down the proper interpretation of Buckman
as it applies to the slight variations of these regulatory compliance statutes.
Indeed, assessing the slight differences among the statutes is particularly
relevant. A statute like Michigan's that explicitly refers to instances of
fraud most clearly implicates the central concerns of Buckman, to the extent
that such statutes are trying to police the communications to which the
Agency had access. However, such a reading is not dispositive, as evinced
by the Second Circuit, the New Jersey Superior Court, and other courts
handing down similar decisions. 2 64
Thus, the crucial issue is the
application of the Buckman principles to the pros and cons of Agency
deference, and how the variations of regulatory compliance statutes show
attempts by state legislatures to strike a balance between federal deference
and state province.
If one reads Buckman narrowly, statutes speaking to any lesser form of
concealment (and probably even bribery) would not invoke the Buckman
concerns, which, the Second Circuit (and others) argue, were principally
about fraud. 265
However, reading Buckman so narrowly is unduly
restrictive. A more plausible reading of Buckman articulates a concern
about policing any forms of communication to which the Agency has
access. If read that way-a reading more in line with the Sixth Circuit's
view-a statute like Michigan's quite clearly implicates Buckman concerns,
as would statutes that deal with any lesser form of concealment. The
policing of any lesser form of concealment (as the Texas and New Jersey
statutes strive to do)2 6 6 also deals with the regulation of the
communications at the Agency's disposal, because the statutes consider
information to which the Agency had access and judge whether there was
concealment, misrepresentation, or incompleteness. The desire to regulate
this information conflicts with the central tenets of Buckman, because each
statute tries to impose a state judgment on the information to which the
Agency had access. 267 Thus, assuming that the broader reading of

CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (2002).

Additionally, Kansas's regulatory compliance statute,

while protecting more broadly than just against punitive damages, requires that the defect in
the manufacturer's product be causally related to the plaintiffs injury. KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-3304(a) (1994).
264. See supra Part I.D.1.
265. See supra Part I.D. 1.
266. See supra Part I.D.2-3.
267. While not the subject of this Note, statutes like those of Kansas, see KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3304(a), and Colorado, see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(1), which remove
protection for noncompliance with Agency regulations (but do not reference concealment,
misrepresentation, or other forms of misconduct), also conceivably implicate the Buckman
concerns. They trigger these concerns because they too seek to make a determination about
the sufficiency of the information that the FDA had when it made its determination. Thus,
these statutes seek to determine noncompliance with Agency standards, without first
requiring that the Agency itself make such a determination, which (assuming the broader
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Buckman is viable, the only statutes that should not be preempted are those
that do not regulate any form of concealment or judge compliance with
Agency standards.
Additionally, the Buckman concerns with respect to the proper
functioning of the FDA are implicated by the statutes because the FDA, in
its preamble, has explicitly articulated its belief that any additional state
regulations will inhibit the proper functioning of the Agency. 268 Despite
the arguments against the preemptive effect of the preamble, it carries
weight because the Supreme Court has long advocated the position that
'269
"federal regulations have no less preemptive effect than federal statutes.
As articulated by the preamble, "FDA approval of labeling under the act
...preempts conflicting or contrary State law." 2 70 Thus, the FDA was
adamant that state law decisions that reject the preemptive authority of FDA
labeling "rely on and propagate interpretations of the act and FDA
regulations that conflict with the agency's own interpretations and frustrate
the agency's implementation of its statutory mandate."'27 1 Incidentally, the
FDA has emphasized that its requirements set both a ceiling and a floor for
manufacturer compliance. 2 72 Furthermore, the FDA has declared that tort
law claims for injuries "interfere with its ability" to properly regulate the
273
market.
The interpretation that the FDA sets out optimal protections is a sound
conclusion given the fact that "safety" when discussing pharmaceutical
products is different than "safety" in the context of other products, since
virtually all drugs have side effects that would lead them to be deemed
"unsafe" when considered in any other context. 274 The FDA's shifting
stance has placed almost all of these regulatory compliance statutes in a
reading of Buckman) touch on the concern of policing the communication at the FDA's
disposal.
268. See supra Part I.A.3.
269. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985)
("We have held repeatedly that state laws can be pre-empted by federal regulations as well
as by federal statutes."). For a general discussion of Hillsborough and its progeny, see
Davis, supra note 29, at 1115. See also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 506 (1996)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Court has a
history of being overinclusive regarding the sources of preemptive intent and extends that
list to "'regulations, preambles, interpretative statements, and responses to comments' as
well as . .. the exercise of [an agency's] explicitly designated power to exempt state
requirements from pre-emption." (quoting Hillsborough,471 U.S. at 718)).
270. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 201.56
(2007)); see also Sharkey, supra note 23, at 227. This formal declaration was given by the
FDA after the courts evinced "reluctance... to accept amicus briefs as a formal statement of
the agency's intent." Dorfman et al., supra note 23, at 593.
271. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934 n.7.
272. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 537 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (noting that the
FDA asserts this position in both its preamble and in its amicus brief submitted for the
court's consideration).
273. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 77.
274. Dorfman et al., supra note 23, at 590.
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questionable position, 27 5 especially with regard to the FDA's interpretation
276
of its powers.
CONCLUSION

In the pharmaceutical context, preemption should apply because the FDA
is the most capable body to make determinations of the safety of
pharmaceutical drugs, and its premarket approval and monitoring processes
are effective and efficient. Allowing juries to second-guess FDA decisions
takes the monitoring of the health and safety of the American public out of
the hands of the most knowledgeable agency and places it into the hands of
individual citizens with limited or no expertise in the area.
Several states (like Michigan, Texas, and New Jersey) have moved this
evaluative process in the right direction, by aiming to place the decisions in
the capable hands of the FDA. However, for the reasons that this Note has
articulated, the exceptions contained in these and similar regulatory
compliance statutes that allow juries to make independent findings of fraud
or misrepresentation, should be severed or qualified by requiring an
independent finding of fraud or misconduct by the Agency itself, for the
exception to be viable. Removing these determinations from juries keeps
the decision-making power in the hands of the most capable agency and
maintains the effectiveness and efficiency of the regulatory process.

275. While not a subject of this Note directly, the statutes of Indiana, Kentucky, and
Tennessee would undoubtedly not be considered to interfere with the Agency's objectives,
as all three provide blanket immunity for compliance with FDA regulations, which is not
removed by any exception for misrepresentation, fraud, etc. See IND. CODE. ANN. § 34-20-51 (LexisNexis 1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (LexisNexis 2005); TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-28-104 (2000).
276. See O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 9, at 77.
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